

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

*The Seventh
Pan-American Conference
Montevideo*

*June 6, 1934
Vol. X, No. 7*

25¢
a copy

Published Fortnightly
by the

\$5.00
a year

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
INCORPORATED
EIGHT WEST FORTIETH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

THE SEVENTH PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE MONTEVIDEO

by

CHARLES A. THOMSON

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

THE American nations at Montevideo thoroughly demonstrated the success of international conference as a method of settling important questions and advancing the general welfare of all." Such was the judgment of Secretary of State Cordell Hull¹ concerning the results achieved at the Seventh International Conference of American States, which met in Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 3-26, 1933. The major questions before this assembly related to inter-American economic cooperation, the Chaco conflict, the organization of peace in the Western Hemisphere, the practice of intervention and "equal rights" for women. The present report examines the action of the Conference concerning these problems and endeavors to appraise the results attained.

All the twenty-one American republics were represented at Montevideo save Costa Rica, whose Congress refused to approve an appropriation covering the expenses of that nation's delegation.² Official delegates numbered ninety-four, of whom three were women.³ The delegations of ten countries were headed by their respective Foreign Ministers: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the United States and Uruguay. The United States delegation was composed of Secretary of State Cordell Hull; Alexander W. Weddell, Ambassador to Argentina; J. Reuben Clark, former Ambassador to Mexico; J. Butler Wright, Minister to Uruguay; Spruille Braden and Professor Sophonisba P. Breckinridge of the University of Chicago. Dr. Ernest Gruening, then an editor of *The Nation*, was general adviser to the delegation.

In accordance with established custom, the presidency of the Conference was awarded to the ranking representative of the host country, and fell to Dr. Alberto Mañé, Minister of Foreign Relations of Uruguay. The Secretary General, named by the President of Uruguay, was Dr. Enrique E. Buero. A "Commission on Initiatives," composed of the heads of all delegations, acted as the steering committee for the gathering. The work of the Conference was divided among ten commissions, which distributed their discussions among twenty-four subcommissions. Every delegation was privileged to be represented on each commission.⁴

In its seven plenary sessions, the Conference adopted six conventions, an Additional Protocol to the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation of 1929, and ninety-four resolutions.⁵ It was decided that the next general Pan-American Conference will be held at Lima, Peru, within five years. Plans were also approved for convening an Economic and Financial Conference at Santiago, Chile, in the near future and, immediately following it, a Commercial Conference at Buenos Aires.⁶

4. The list of the ten commissions, with their respective chairmen (all of whom were Latin Americans) was as follows: I. Organization of Peace, Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal of Chile; II. Problems of International Law, Afranio de Mello Franco of Brazil; III. Political and Civil Rights of Women, A. Skinner Klee of Guatemala; IV. Economic and Financial Problems, José Manuel Puig Casauranc of Mexico; V. Social Problems, Justo Pastor Benítez of Paraguay; VI. Intellectual Cooperation, Justin Barau of Haiti; VII. Communications, Casto Rojas of Bolivia; VIII. International Conferences of American States, Leonardo Argüello of Nicaragua; IX. New Economic Matters, Carlos Saavedra Lamas of Argentina; X. Coordination and Style, Miguel Paz Parahona of Honduras. J. Butler Wright of the United States delegation was vice-president of Commission VII.

Each of the first eight commissions had responsibility for one of the chapters into which the conference agenda was divided. The ninth and tenth commissions were created by the Conference: the ninth to consider special economic subjects; the tenth to coordinate and edit the conclusions of the Conference. On the scope of the ninth commission, cf. the speech of Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Argentine Foreign Minister, in *Diario*, No. 5, p. 2-5.

5. The conventions related to the following subjects: 1. Nationality of Women; 2. Nationality; 3. Extradition; 4. Political Asylum; 5. Teaching of History; and 6. Rights and Duties of States. For the text of these documents, cf. *Seventh International Conference of American States, Final Act* (Provisional Edition, Montevideo). Hereafter cited as *Final Act*.

6. Due to delay in convening the Economic and Financial Conference, it was announced from Argentina on April 20 that the Commercial Conference might be convened first. Cf. *New York Times*, April 21, 1934.

1. Address delivered at a luncheon with the chiefs of the Latin American missions in Washington, January 29, 1934. Cf. U. S. Department of State, *Press Releases*, February 3, 1934, p. 59.

2. President Jiménez of Costa Rica, in a cablegram to the Conference on December 11, pledged the signature of his country to the agreements which might be reached. Cf. *Diario de la VII Conferencia Internacional Americana* (Montevideo), No. 9, p. 10. These official minutes of the Conference are hereafter cited as *Diario*.

3. One each on the delegations of Paraguay, the United States and Uruguay.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, VOL. X, NO. 7, JUNE 6, 1934

Published by-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION Incorporated, 8 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A. RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, President; WILLIAM T. STONE, Vice President and Washington representative; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; HELEN TERRY, Assistant Editor. Research Associates: T. A. BISSEON, VERA MICHELES DEAN, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, MAXWELL S. STEWART, CHARLES A. THOMSON, M. S. WERTHEIMER, JOHN C. DEWILDE. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 a year; to F. P. A. members \$3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

GROWTH OF GOOD FEELING

Preparations for the Montevideo Conference had gone forward in an atmosphere of increasing pessimism. Opinion in many quarters favored its postponement, despite the fact that its original date—December 1932—had already been set over one year. The failure of the World Economic Conference and the Geneva Disarmament negotiations had cast the whole international conference system into disrepute. Various inter-American problems, moreover, had reached an acute stage. The costly Chaco "war" between Bolivia and Paraguay, the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru, and the revolution in Cuba had strained political relations. Debt defaults and trade restrictions, including high tariffs, exchange controls, quotas and licensing systems, had seriously injured economic relations. It was feared that the Conference would aggravate rather than alleviate many of these difficulties.

To an unexpected extent, however, the Montevideo gathering disappointed such apprehensions. Not the least of its achievements was the surprising degree of genuine good feeling which characterized its sessions. The cordial attitude of the Latin-American representatives toward the United States offered a marked contrast to the hostility displayed during the two previous conferences at Santiago, Chile and Havana. Particularly noteworthy were the frank yet friendly statements of Dr. Puig Casauranc of Mexico and the close cooperation given the North American delegation by Argentina, which in the past had been not only the leading critic of the United States, but also its greatest rival for leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Although this cooperation was undoubtedly based on practical considerations,⁷ it was an important factor in the agreements achieved by the Conference.

This cordiality toward the United States did not result from silencing adverse criticism. On the contrary, the exercise of relative free speech in the Conference, permitting discussion of controversial questions, apparently facilitated the development of confidence and friendly feeling. President Gabriel Terra of Uruguay, in his opening address, referred to the Hawley-Smoot tariff and its "lamentable results." Cuba and Haiti aired their respective grievances. The question of debts was brought into the open by Dr. Puig of Mexico.⁸

The personality and policy of Secretary Hull also contributed to dissipate distrust of the United States. His honesty, sincerity

and simplicity won the respect and admiration of the other delegates. Behind these immediate factors was the increasing belief of the Latin Americans that the United States was abandoning its former practice of intervention in the Caribbean countries. The whole program of the "New Deal," moreover, had aroused a markedly sympathetic response in Latin America, and contributed toward the development of a new cordiality.

INITIAL SKIRMISHES

The first week of the Conference proved uneventful save for two contests which served to indicate both the relative strength of the leading delegations and their probable alignment in future discussions. One of these contests had to do with the relation of Pan-Americanism to European nations and the League of Nations. The other concerned a Mexican bid for leadership.

At the first meeting of the steering committee, Argentina presented a motion authorizing Spain to name an observer at the Conference and, at the instance of Brazil, this proposition was amplified to include a Portuguese observer. On the same day—December 4—the Secretary General of the Conference released an extensive memorandum prepared at Geneva on *The Work of the League of Nations in relation to the Agenda of the Seventh Pan-American Conference*.⁹ This brochure, in addition to its review of League activities, recounted the steps which had led to the sending of a League "observer" to Montevideo.¹⁰

The possibility of observers at the Conference representing the League and various European nations stirred opposition from Secretary Hull. If Spain and Portugal were entitled to representation as mother countries of the Latin-American nations, it was argued that France and Great Britain might merit similar consideration as the mother lands respectively of Haiti and the United States. Before sanctioning interlocking relationships with world organizations or European states, Mr. Hull maintained that

9. Geneva, November 1933. For a résumé of the relations of the American states to the League of Nations, cf. Stephen P. Duggan, "Latin America, the League, and the United States," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1934, p. 281-293. A fuller discussion is found in Warren H. Kelchner, *Latin-American Relations with the League of Nations* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1933).

10. On August 7, 1933 Dr. Buero, Secretary General of the Conference, officially advised the Secretary General of the League of Nations of the coming gathering and suggested the preparation of the memorandum mentioned above. Three months later, in answer to a communication suggesting "the sending to Montevideo of a high official of the League," the Secretary General appointed Julian Nogueira, a Uruguayan member of the Secretariat, to attend the Conference as an observer. On November 17, however, apparently as the result of representations from Washington, Dr. Buero announced that Sr. Nogueira would come to Montevideo, but would not attend the Conference. *New York Times*, November 18, 1933. In a newspaper interview after his arrival at Montevideo, Sr. Nogueira declared that he was present as a League "observer," not with any right to participate even passively in the deliberations of the Conference, but only to follow its labors as best he could "from the outside." *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), December 6, 1933.

7. Cf. p. 92.

8. Cf. *Diario*, No. 2, p. 4; No. 3, p. 8; No. 6, p. 3. For the pressure exerted by various Latin-American delegates, to eliminate from the address of Dr. Giraudy of Cuba certain expressions considered critical of the United States, cf. Herminio Portell Vilá, "Cuba y la Conferencia de Montevideo," *Bohemia* (Havana), March 18, 1934.

the purposes of Pan-Americanism should be re-examined, in order that a definite policy governing its relation with other international movements might be laid down. As a result of his initiative, the Conference on December 16 adopted a resolution postponing consideration of the whole question and entrusting to the next Pan-American Conference the task of determining the principles that must guide the admission to future conferences "of observers of organizations or of non-American States . . . as well as of their character and prerogatives." The next Conference was also asked to study "the activities and methods of cooperation with other parts of the world by the Pan American Organization." The whole problem was to be approached in such a way as "to insure the full and wholehearted cooperation of the International Conferences of American States and of the Pan American Union with non-American organizations and States, without complicating or involving the integrity of the international organization of the twenty-one American Republics."¹¹

MEXICO'S VIEWS ON DEBTS AND SILVER

If in this first contest the point of view of the United States triumphed over that of Argentina, in the second skirmish, Argentina, Brazil and Chile scored a victory over Mexico. Mexico had sent to Montevideo not only the most thoroughly prepared but also the second largest delegation present at the Conference. Since the previous July Mexico had sought amplification of the Conference agenda in order to include consideration of a debt moratorium running from six to ten years, and also of the remonetization of silver, one of its own most important products.¹²

Dr. Puig Casauranc, head of the Mexican delegation, whose addresses were outstanding for their social sympathies as well as for their length and eloquence, supported his country's proposals in a speech before the steering committee on December 4. He admitted that the moratorium suggested might signify an attack on the interests of the

"super-bankers." But he argued that unless "the worm-eaten system of credit" was transformed into a "social function," all the generous purposes of Secretary Hull in favor of tariff reform were doomed to failure.¹³

It had been expected that the United States would oppose consideration of the debt question. Secretary Hull, however, lost no time in declaring: "I have no interest in avoiding discussion. On the contrary, I would express a desire for the freest and frankest discussion possible on these matters." He pointed out, nevertheless, that he was not "authorized to vote either for or against any resolution to which the discussion of these points might lead . . . Neither I nor my government have authority to represent in this conference either creditors or debtors." Referring to the bankers he continued: "I take the liberty to say here, with all frankness, that the international bankers, as a rule, are not and have not been supporters of the Roosevelt Administration."

It was Argentina which led the opposition against the Mexican program. Its brilliant and ambitious Foreign Minister, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, emphasized the wide differences in the financial situation of the several American countries. The proposal for a uniform moratorium "might have harmful repercussions on the credit of the various countries which have labored painfully to maintain it." As a result of this opposition, the Mexican projects were referred with many verbal tributes to the Inter-American High Commission.¹⁴ Although thus buried as far as discussion at Montevideo was concerned, subsequent action transferring their consideration to the Pan-American Financial Conference at Santiago promised the possibility of resurrection at a more opportune time.¹⁵

EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

The only important topic at the Conference on which the United States delegation for a time openly opposed majority sentiment was that relating to equal rights for women. The sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana had authorized the constitution of an Inter-American Commission of Women, representing all the American states, to study the status of women under the laws of the several countries and report to the Seventh Conference.¹⁶

11. Cf. *New York Times*, December 7, 1933 and *Diario*, No. 6, p. 2; No. 8, p. 2. For the text of the resolution, cf. *Final Act*, p. 11, 12. A discussion of the relation of Pan-Americanism and the League of Nations, as evidenced in the Conference debates, is given in Carlos Dávila, "The Montevideo Conference: Antecedents and Accomplishments," *International Conciliation* (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1934), p. 131-136.

12. For the full text of the Mexican proposal, cf. *Diario*, No. 4, p. 2-4. Among other matters it favored the establishment of international bodies of a juridical character "to negotiate debt agreements without the intervention of committees of bankers." Since 1919 an International Committee of Bankers, in which representatives of J. P. Morgan and Company have played a prominent part, has directed negotiations with Mexico concerning renewal of loan payments. Mexico is in default for a larger sum than any other Latin-American country. Government, state and city bonds (including the debt of the National Railways), on which payment has been suspended, total \$621,800,695, with accrued interest of \$554,706,760. Cf. Max Winkler, *Foreign Bonds: An Autopsy* (Philadelphia, Roland Swain, 1933), p. 193-200. For the history of the Mexican debt, cf. Edgar Turlington, *Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930).

13. In this address Dr. Puig made the only open reference expressed at the Conference to the many dictatorships and semi-dictatorships represented at Montevideo. Cf. *Diario*, No. 6, p. 7.

14. This body, formerly the International High Commission, was established by the First Pan-American Financial Conference in 1915. The commission was charged with general responsibility for furthering study and action on financial questions. Cf. James Brown Scott, *International Conferences of American States* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 232.

15. For the debate and actions taken on the Mexican proposals, cf. *Diario*, No. 6, p. 2-26; No. 11, p. 2-4; also *Final Act*, p. 11.

16. Cf. Scott, *The International Conferences of American States, 1889-1928*, cited, p. 403, 494 ff.

This commission was organized with Miss Doris Stevens of the United States as chairman, and presented at Montevideo a report declaring that the assumption, embodied in the laws of most American states, that "men are by nature entitled to rule over women is, on its face, scandalous and unworthy of a hemisphere dedicated to freedom." The present status of women, according to the report, "can only be termed that of a slave." The commission called on the American states "to outlaw the anti-social system which now stigmatizes one-half of the adult members of their communities as irresponsible wards of man and of the State," and asked that the Conference approve a treaty providing for removal of all discrimination between the sexes with regard to nationality as well as to civil and political rights.¹⁷

The plenary session of the Conference on December 16, which was addressed by six members of the commission, approved a vote of applause to this body and requested it to continue its activities, in order to furnish the next Pan-American Conference with proposals for putting into effect "the principles of equality of rights between men and

women."¹⁸ A treaty convention was approved providing that in the American states: "There will be no distinction based on sex as regards nationality, in their legislation or in their practice." On the question of civil and political rights, however, the Conference limited itself to recommending that the American republics grant these "so far as the peculiar circumstances of each country will conveniently permit."¹⁹

The National Woman's party in the United States had from the beginning played the major rôle in this campaign for equal rights. Other women's organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, opposed the movement as futile and endangering the protective legislation for women already in force. The United States delegation at Montevideo apparently sympathized with this second position, and at first refused support to the equal nationality treaty which had been approved by the other delegations. On December 20, however, as the result of numerous protests from Senators, Congressmen and various women's groups, this position was reversed and Secretary Hull announced that the United States would adhere.²⁰

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Discussion in the Latin American press preliminary to the Montevideo Conference had centered so largely on economic questions that the coming gathering was often referred to as an economic congress. Hopes that the Conference might serve to promote economic reconstruction may have been strengthened by the shift in Washington's foreign trade policy, following the failure of the World Economic Conference in the summer of 1933. Negotiations for reciprocal trade agreements were opened with Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. On November 9, however, the White House issued a statement declaring that, because of temporary emergency policies, the United States delegation at Montevideo would have "to forego immediate discussion of such matters as currency stabilization, uniform import prohibitions, permanent customs duties, and the like."²¹ The ban on tariff discussion by United States delegates, however, was subsequently lifted, due largely to Secretary Hull's persistent appeals to Washington.

While the Roosevelt declaration damped the expectations of the Latin-American delegates, it did not alter their determination to air economic difficulties at Montevideo. On December 4 Dr. Saavedra Lamas proposed the creation of a preparatory committee for a Pan-American economic and commercial conference, and urged that the United States should lead the American republics in an effort to reconvene the World Economic Conference. Peru advocated the creation of an international American bank. Both Uruguay and Brazil declared in favor of a tariff truce, and the former proposed organization of an "International American Institute of Economic and Financial Reconstruction and Cooperation."²²

The only major economic measure to win general support, however, was the tariff resolution presented by Secretary Hull on December 12. It proposed: (1) the lowering of high customs duties through the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral reciprocity treaties; (2) the elimination of those duties which "almost completely exclude interna-

17. *Report of the Inter-American Commission of Women to the Seventh International Conference of American States on the Civil and Political Rights of Women* (Montevideo, December 1933), p. 5.

18. Cf. *Final Act*, p. 35. A proposal to constitute the women members of the official delegations at Montevideo into a commission charged with the formulation of a future program—a move designed apparently to supplant the present commission by a rival body—was adopted by the steering committee, but failed of approval in the plenary session. (*Diario*, No. 21, p. 15, 21.) The Conference did suggest, however, that the commission should rotate its presidency among the various countries represented among its members. (*Final Act*, p. 36.)

19. *Final Act*, p. 35, 36, 135-141. On May 14 the Supervisory Committee of the Pan American Union decided that this treaty is open to the nations of the world for adherence. A treaty granting complete equal rights, although not considered directly by the Conference and not listed in the *Final Act*, was signed by Cuba, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay.

20. *Final Act*, p. 75. The Conference also adopted a resolution recommending that at the next Conference women members be included in all the delegations.

21. Instead, the Conference was urged to devote its discussions to intellectual cooperation, improvement of communications and development of a Pan-American highway. Cf. State Department, *Press Releases*, November 11, 1933.

22. Cf. *Diario*, No. 6, p. 26, 35; No. 9, p. 4, 7; No. 14, p. 32.

tional competition, such as those which restrict the importation of particular commodities to less than 3 to 5 per cent of domestic consumption," or those "which have been in effect for a considerable period of time without having brought about domestic production equal to 15 per cent of the total domestic consumption thereof"; (3) the continuation of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause;²³ and (4) the establishment of a permanent international agency to compile and circulate information concerning the progress achieved in reducing trade barriers.

In introducing this resolution, Secretary Hull made it clear that his proposal did not call for any "treaties, conventions or legal commitments" and signified only a declaration of future policy. Despite these assurances, the resolution occasioned active and long-continued debate and was only approved on the fourth day of discussion.²⁴ The proposal for lowering customs duties was hailed by the delegates of several countries as indicating an important modification of the former tariff policy of the United States. The Argentine Foreign Minister welcomed the motion as a step toward giving Pan-Americanism an "economic content," the need of which he had previously emphasized. Argentina, in fact, was foremost among supporters of the Hull proposal.²⁵ Dr. Puig Casauranc of Mexico, while applauding the Hull motion as an attack on high tariffs and a beginning at Pan-American economic cooperation, argued that tariff reduction alone would not remedy the existing depression. The evil was deeper. While credit continued to be inflated, while disparity between the gains of capital and those of labor prevailed, it was illusory to hope for economic improvement.

In the succeeding discussion the idea of a Pan-American program for lower tariffs was attacked from two sides. Countries like Salvador, Peru and Haiti, which sell a considerable if not the greater part of their exports to Europe, objected to such a policy on

the ground that it would discriminate against European nations, thus provoking reprisals which would hamper profitable trade relations. On the other hand, the Hull proposal was criticized as endangering the possibility of a Latin-American customs union. Dr. Antonio Parra of Ecuador maintained that the most-favored-nation formula should not be approved if it would block the possibility of preferential agreements among the Latin-American states. Chile supported this position, arguing that special favors to neighboring nations should be made an exception to the most-favored-nation principle.²⁶

Summing up the debate on the fourth day, Dr. Puig pointed out that the Hull resolution presented two main propositions: (1) a pledge to lower tariff barriers, which was so directly in accord with the needs of Latin America as to merit unanimous approval;²⁷ and (2) acceptance of the principle of equal treatment (most-favored-nation) as the basis of commercial policy, which could only be approved with reservations because of the special conditions of various American states. Objections to this second point, however, were quieted, when the United States delegation made it clear that an affirmative vote on the Hull declaration would represent not an obligatory pledge concerning future action, but only general approval of the principles involved. The proposal was finally adopted unanimously.²⁸ The debate, however, had brought into the open not only the differing conditions and ambitions of the Latin American states, but also the difficulties obstructing both a purely American trade agreement and maintenance of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle.

Other resolutions adopted dealt with disapproval of import prohibitions, commercial arbitration, promotion of tourist travel, protection of patents, bills of exchange and bills of lading. Definite action on currency stabilization, a common monetary system and the project for an Inter-American Organization of Economic and Financial Cooperation (with its provisions for a Consulting Economic Commission and an Inter-American Bank) was deferred to the Santiago and Buenos Aires conferences.

23. Although the possible negotiation of regional agreements was somewhat safeguarded by the suggestion that the subscribing governments "declare and call upon all countries to declare that they will not invoke their right to demand under the most-favored-nation clause contained in bilateral treaties . . . any benefits of multilateral treaties which have as their general purpose the liberalization of international economic relations . . ." For the text of the Hull proposal, cf. State Department, *Press Releases*, December 13, 1933.

24. For the text of the debate, cf. *Diario*, No. 10, p. 2-12; No. 11, p. 14-26; No. 12, p. 2-16; No. 13, p. 28-36.

25. At Havana an Argentine declaration favoring reduction of economic barriers was strongly opposed by the United States. For this debate, which resulted in the resignation of Honorio Pueyrredón, head of the Argentine delegation, cf. "The Sixth Pan-American Conference, Part I," *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, April 27, 1928, p. 57-60. Subsequently, however, changes of administration had taken place in both Argentina and the United States. It was reported, moreover, that Argentine approval of the Hull proposal had been traded for United States support of the Argentine anti-war pact. For a résumé of the tariff discussions at the Fourth Pan-American Commercial Conference (Washington, 1931), cf. Dávila, "The Montevideo Conference," cited, p. 143-145.

26. Although this point was partially safeguarded in the Hull declaration (footnote 23), the Conference approved an additional resolution favoring "the granting of exclusive commercial advantages by contiguous or neighboring countries." Cf. *Final Act*, p. 94.

27. While many Latin-American republics depend on customs duties for at least half of their fiscal revenues, they incline to support a low tariff policy internationally to assure favorable markets for exports, on which their economy is so largely based.

28. With reservations by Ecuador, Haiti, Peru and Salvador. Before the vote was taken, Haiti made it clear that because of the financial control "imposed" by the United States, it could not sign any trade agreement without the previous approval of the United States financial adviser.

THE CHACO CONFLICT

Although not officially on the agenda, the Chaco conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay, with its open denial of American solidarity, constituted the most urgent problem before the Conference. In defiance of all past efforts to organize peace in the American hemisphere, this conflict had continued for eighteen months, causing an estimated loss of 100,000 men in killed and wounded. Three agencies—a group of neighboring countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru), a Committee of Neutrals in Washington and the League of Nations—had labored fruitlessly to end the struggle.²⁹ The two American groups had finally withdrawn from the field, giving the League of Nations a free hand. By action on May 20 and July 3, 1933 the League Council authorized sending to the Chaco a commission to negotiate cessation of hostilities and an arbitration agreement, and to conduct if necessary a full inquiry into the dispute.³⁰ This commission, headed by J. Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Ambassador to Mexico, reached South America early in November and proceeded to visit both combatant nations.

The failure of all previous peace efforts caused some to argue that the Conference should avoid discussion of the struggle. It was alleged that further interference from the outside might serve only to exacerbate the passions of the belligerents. Those of a contrary opinion maintained that for the Conference to ignore the Chaco question would be to confess complete futility. The Chilean Foreign Minister declared: "If in this solemn opportunity, we . . . are not able to measure up to the purpose which calls us together, namely that of demonstrating the existence of continental fraternity, it would be better for us to renounce meeting in new assemblies." The result would be, according to the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, "that the Pan-American Conference would be a comedy played in front of a cemetery."³¹

The Conference, far from ignoring the problem, early displayed its concern to achieve a satisfactory solution. Even before the formal sessions began, Secretary Hull in his visits to the other delegations had expressed his profound desire that the conflict be ended. President Terra declared in his opening address: "We have been proud of being the continent of peace and arbitration In my opinion the Conference which

I today have the honor of inaugurating, cannot close its ears to the clamor of American opinion The noble juridical tradition of America cannot remain buried in the swamps of the Chaco."³²

In attacking the question, the Conference had to decide whether it would cooperate with the League Commission already in the field or independently seek a settlement of the dispute. Various suggestions were presented, but opinion finally inclined to the former course, and a subcommission was named to study the matter.³³ Meanwhile President Terra, in great part at Mr. Hull's suggestion, had initiated direct conversations with the representatives in Montevideo of Bolivia and Paraguay. On December 12 the Conference subcommission joined forces with him, and three days later a Conference motion pledged the American states "to cooperate with the League of Nations in the application of the Covenant."³⁴

It had been feared that the success of the peace negotiations might be hindered by the decisive victory of the Paraguayan army on December 10 and 11, when 10,000 Bolivian troops were captured. But on December 18 Paraguay offered Bolivia a truce until the end of the year—a tender which was formally accepted on the following day. The news of this victory, announced at a dramatic session of the First Commission on December 19, called forth a wave of jubilation and thanksgiving, in which warm tributes were paid to all the agencies which had labored to end the war: the League and its Commission, the Washington Commission of Neutrals, the group of neighboring countries, and President Terra.

Then, however, came reverses. On the initiative of the United States and Brazil, the specific pledge on the part of the American states to cooperate with the League was modified into a promise to support "in accordance with the special circumstances and policy of each government, the formula of settlement which may be arrived at for the solution of the Chaco conflict."³⁵ Thus the possibility of applying League sanctions was weakened. Enthusiasm was further cooled by charges that the armed forces of both Bolivia and Paraguay had violated the

32. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 2, p. 3.

33. Cf. *Diario*, No. 5, p. 14. This decision was criticized in the Latin-American press as having blocked open efforts on the part of the Conference to settle the conflict and transferred the negotiations to a small subcommission meeting behind closed doors. Cf. *El Dia* (Montevideo), December 10, 1933.

34. Cf. *Diario*, No. 13, p. 17-19. On December 17, both President Terra and Secretary Hull telegraphed the Presidents of Bolivia and Paraguay, urging them to accept an armistice. It was alleged that pressure from the United States was particularly influential in bringing Bolivia to an agreement. (*New York Times*, December 18, 20, 1933.)

35. *Diario*, No. 17, p. 2.

29. For the background of the conflict and the efforts to end it, cf. Agnes S. Waddell, "Unsettled Boundary Disputes in Latin America," Foreign Policy Association, *Information Service*, March 5, 1930; and John C. deWilde, "South American Conflicts," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 24, 1933.

30. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, June 1933, p. 760-770; September 1933, p. 1072-79.

31. Cf. *Diario*, No. 13, p. 15; No. 16, p. 11.

truce. On December 24 the Conference, in view of its approaching adjournment, formally turned over responsibility for the Chaco negotiations to the League Commission—which had returned to Montevideo on the previous day.³⁶ This action was supplemented by a motion presented by Secretary Hull at the closing session of the Conference, which urged both belligerent nations, in view of their membership in the League of Nations, “to accept juridical processes for the settlement of their differences.”³⁷ The members of the League Commission were present at this session and were given an enthusiastic ovation. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, chairman of the League commission, thanked the Conference for its peace efforts and paid tribute to the cooperative endeavors which had resulted in the truce.

Thus the Conference adjourned, leaving the unsolved dispute in the hands of the League. Hopes of peace were balked, however, by the recalcitrance of the combatant nations.³⁸ The commission was unable to secure the acceptance of a plan of arbitration, and fighting was renewed on January 7. The League body nevertheless continued its offices, and on February 24 submitted in the form of a draft treaty a proposal both for the settlement of the territorial dispute by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and for interim measures of security to prevent further armed clashes.³⁹ When this offer was rejected by the belligerents, the commission returned to Geneva to prepare its report, which was published on May 12.

ORGANIZATION OF PEACE MACHINERY

Linked with the efforts of the conference to end the Chaco conflict were its endeavors to strengthen inter-American peace machinery. In addition to the commitments outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Anti-War Pact,⁴⁰ peace organization in the Western Hemisphere rested on three accords: the Gondra Conciliation Treaty of 1923 and the Pan-American Arbitration and Conciliation Treaties of 1929.⁴¹

The failure of many of the American states to sign these treaties constituted a

serious weakness in peace organization. Although the Gondra Treaty had been ratified by all the twenty-one American nations except Argentina and Bolivia, the 1929 Arbitration Treaty had been approved by only twelve countries, and the Conciliation Treaty by fourteen.⁴² Moreover, the inter-American peace movement was apparently threatened by the development of two rival systems of organization. Argentina, which had failed to sign not only the three American accords, but also the Anti-War Pact, had launched in 1932 its own peace pact, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas.

The treaty condemned wars of aggression, bound its signatories to settle their disputes “only through the pacific means established by international law,” and pledged the non-recognition of territorial changes effected by violence. Should any signatory violate the treaty, the others, as neutrals, are to “adopt a common and solidary attitude; they shall exercise the political, juridical or economic means authorized by international law; they shall bring the influence of public opinion to bear; but in no case shall they resort to intervention, either diplomatic or armed.” Disputes are to be submitted to commissions of conciliation. This treaty was signed on October 10, 1933 at Rio de Janeiro by six American nations—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay.⁴³ Shortly after the opening of the Conference, Dr. Saavedra Lamas had his pact read into the official record, and enthusiastic praise was voiced both of the document and its author.

On December 10, however, a two-hour conference between Mr. Hull and Dr. Saavedra Lamas apparently resulted in an agreement by which the United States pledged its support to the Argentine anti-war pact, in return for which Argentina agreed to sign four other peace treaties and to back the Hull tariff proposal which was to be presented two days later. This step was followed by a joint declaration of the Argentine and Chilean delegations, pre-

36. For the text of the resolution, cf. *Final Act*, p. 78.

37. *Diario*, No. 22, p. 2.

38. Some observers, linking the overshadowing influence of Argentina in Paraguay with the latter's determination to renew hostilities, charged Argentina with secretly stimulating the struggle. Cf. *Nuestro Diario* (Guatemala City), March 5, 1934.

39. Cf. John C. deWilde, “The Chaco War Defies Settlement,” *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, March 16, 1934, and *New York Times*, March 13, 1934.

40. At the time of the Montevideo Conference, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador and the United States were not members of the League. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Salvador and Uruguay had not signed the Anti-War Pact.

41. For the provisions of these treaties, cf. William T. Stone, “The Pan-American Arbitration Treaty,” *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, November 13, 1929.

42. The following states had not ratified the Arbitration Treaty: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, the United States and Uruguay. (Peru had ratified, but had failed to deposit the instrument of ratification.) Non-signatories of the Conciliation Treaty included Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Peru and Colombia had failed to complete their ratification.) These treaties were not applicable to the Chaco conflict, since both Bolivia and Paraguay had failed to sign either of them. Cf. *Report on the Activities of the Pan American Union, 1928-1933* (Pan American Union, Washington, 1933), p. 23, 24. The Latin-American states have also been remiss in ratifying obligations assumed under League auspices. Cf. Duggan, “Latin America, the League and the United States,” cited, p. 289.

43. As the first non-American power to sign the pact, Italy affixed its signature on March 14. (*La Nación*, Buenos Aires, March 15, 1934.) On April 27 representatives of thirteen American nations, including the United States, affixed their signatures to the Argentine anti-war pact. The Dominican Republic and Peru now remain the only American states which have not signed the treaty. (Cf. *New York Times*, April 28, 1934.)

sented on December 15, which called upon the American states to sign and ratify such of five peace and arbitration treaties as they had hitherto not accepted. These treaties were: (1) the Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts, commonly known as the Gondra Conciliation Treaty of 1923; (2) the Inter-American Convention on Conciliation of 1929; (3) the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty of the same year; (4) the Briand-Kellogg Pact; and (5) the Argentine Anti-War Treaty of 1933. Dr. Saavedra Lamas declared that Argentina would sign the Gondra Treaty, the two 1929 treaties and the Anti-War Pact. Secretary Hull announced the adherence of the United States to the Argentine anti-war declaration. During a space of three hours, country after country added its pledges to the mounting structure of good will. The unanimous adoption of the proposal aligned all the American states behind these five peace instruments, a step which was hailed as promising effectively to strengthen and coordinate American peace machinery. It apparently ended the threat of Argentine-United States rivalry in the organization of peace.⁴⁴

Existing peace machinery was also strengthened by the approval of an Additional Protocol to the 1929 Pan-American Conciliation Treaty. This Protocol gave a permanent character to the *ad hoc* commissions of investigation and conciliation provided in the 1929 convention.⁴⁵ In an effort to expedite the ratification of treaties signed at Pan-American Conferences, the Pan American Union is authorized to dispatch special representatives to the various countries. The Union is also to ascertain from the individual republics the objections which are preventing ratification, and to report these to the next Pan-American Conference.⁴⁶ The Mexican Peace Code,⁴⁷ designed to concentrate and coordinate in one document the many existing proposals to prevent conflicts, was referred to the consideration of the American governments, through the intermediary of the Pan American Union.⁴⁸

44. For this discussion, cf. *Diario*, No. 13, p. 6-14.

45. For the text of the Additional Protocol, cf. *Final Act*, p. 177, 178. Instead of the *ad hoc* commissions of investigation and conciliation originally stipulated, which were not to be named until after a controversy had arisen, the Additional Protocol provides for permanent commissions, to which each country shall name without delay two delegates by means of a bilateral agreement with each one of the other signatories, the fifth member of each commission to be appointed by the Pan American Union. The Conference did not approve a project, prepared by the Executive Committee of the American Institute of International Law, for a single permanent conciliation commission of a new character. For a discussion of the Conference debates on these matters, cf. Dávila, "The Montevideo Conference," cited.

46. For the text of these resolutions, cf. *Final Act*, p. 71, 72.

47. For text, cf. *ibid.*, p. 109-134.

48. The Conference also adopted a resolution, sponsored by J. Reuben Clark of the United States delegation, declaring that the offer of good offices or mediation in a controversy shall never be deemed an unfriendly act, although such good offices shall not be applicable when other methods of peaceful solution may have begun to function. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

In the field of international law, conventions on nationality, extradition and political asylum were adopted.⁴⁹ Provision was made for further progress in the codification of international law, a topic to which previous conferences have dedicated considerable attention.⁵⁰ A resolution recognized "the necessity of coordinating this work with the work of codification being done by the League of Nations," and provided in broad outlines for: (1) the maintenance of the International Commission of Jurists, created by the Rio Conference of 1906, to be composed of jurists named by each American government; (2) the establishment by each government of a national commission for codification of international law; and (3) the creation of a Commission of Experts, composed of seven members and charged with the duty of organizing the preliminary work of codification.⁵¹

The conference also adopted a declaration on the industrial and agricultural use of international rivers, but referred projects on treaties and their interpretation, determination of an aggressor, condition of neutrals, and the international responsibility of the state to the International Commission of Jurists.

THE PAN AMERICAN UNION

Although the reorganization of the Pan American Union was extensively debated at the Santiago and Havana Conferences, it was little discussed at Montevideo. A resolution was approved, however, requesting the next Conference to consider possible changes in the organization of the Union "with a view to rendering its operation more effective."⁵² It was also recommended that documents of all future Pan-American conferences be published within a year from the date of adjournment in accord with a uniform plan.⁵³

49. *Ibid.*, p. 142-163. According to the Nationality Convention, naturalization relates only to the individual naturalized, neither marriage nor its dissolution affecting the nationality of husband, wife or children. The act signifies the loss of previous nationality. The Extradition Convention provides for the surrender to other signatory states of persons accused or under sentence for crimes with a minimum penalty of one year's imprisonment. Offenses of a political nature and those which are "purely military or against religion" are not extraditable. The Convention on Political Asylum revises the 1923 Havana Convention. It denies the right to those who have been prosecuted for common offenses, but sanctions political asylum.

50. For a brief review of Pan-American efforts to codify international law, cf. "The Sixth Pan-American Conference, Part II," Foreign Policy Association, *Information Service*, July 6, 1928.

51. For the text of the resolution, cf. *Final Act*, p. 79-83.

52. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 75. This Conference is also to study the question of the Union's cooperation with other international agencies. Cf. p. 88.

53. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 70. The proceedings of the Havana Conference had not been made generally available. There has also been a demand "for the periodical publication of the proceedings of the Governing Board, which are not now published in any form." "Recommendations as to the Pan-American Conference at Montevideo," *Foreign Policy Committee Reports*, No. 1 (New York, Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, November 1933), p. 9.

THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION

At the Havana Conference representatives of thirteen states made strong declarations against the practice of intervention but, due to opposition from the United States, definite action on the question was postponed until the Montevideo Conference.⁵⁴ Before that body convened, however, the United States had succeeded in substantially liquidating its two interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti. The Roosevelt administration, moreover, had exercised unexpected restraint when faced by the revolution in Cuba. Nevertheless, the presence of thirty United States war vessels in Cuban waters and Washington's refusal to recognize the government of President Grau San Martín—which had sent delegates to Montevideo—together with the prospective continuance of financial control over Haiti, kept the intervention question a live issue.⁵⁵ A statement by a Colombian delegate that the United States had not intervened in Cuba was challenged by Sr. Giraudy. He declared:

"It is not possible to remain silent when it is affirmed that the United States does not wish to intervene in Cuba, because this is not true. If intervention means . . . the material occupation of a country, the subjugation of a people, then the statement may be correct. But if it is not intervention when in a defenceless nation a representative of the United States incites part of the people against the government . . . ; if it is not intervention to surround a defenceless island by a threatening squadron in the attempt to impose upon it a government it does not desire, then there has never been any intervention in America."⁵⁶

The question came before the Conference for debate on December 19, in connection with a convention on the rights and duties of states,⁵⁷ the text of whose most important articles is as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

ARTICLE 2. The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.

ARTICLE 3. The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon

its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.

The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.

ARTICLE 4. States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.

ARTICLE 5. The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE 6. The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

ARTICLE 7. The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.

ARTICLE 8. No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

ARTICLE 9. The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.

Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.

ARTICLE 10. The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any claims which arise between them should be settled by recognized pacific methods.

ARTICLE 11. The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consist in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.

The United States delegation, in the apparent hope of avoiding discussion of the intervention question, had suggested that before action was taken by a Pan-American Conference, the question should be carefully considered and the terms defined by a committee of jurists. The current of feeling unloosed in the debate, however, was too strong to be channelled into approval of such a course.⁵⁸ The small states, those which had known the presence of foreign troops on their own soil—the Dominican Republic, Cuba,⁵⁹ Haiti, Nicaragua—were the first to make themselves heard, and united in condemning intervention. Their position

54. For a review of the debate, cf. "The Sixth Pan American Conference, Part I," cited. No precise definition of intervention is generally recognized, but it usually means the forcible interference by a powerful state or a group of states in the affairs of a weak state, without a declaration of war.

55. The Haitian delegation voyaged to Montevideo on the same steamer with Secretary Hull, and conversations en route, it is asserted, resulted in declarations from the Secretary favoring a prompt ending of American financial control. On November 29, however, President Roosevelt in a letter to President Vincent stated that inescapable treaty obligations prevented termination of the United States financial administration unless a refunding operation could be worked out satisfactory to the holders of Haitian bonds. Cf. *Diario*, No. 13, p. 35; Hubert Herring, "Pan Americanism, New Style," *Harper's Magazine*, May 1934, p. 686; and *New York Herald Tribune*, December 3, 6, 1933.

56. Cf. *Diario*, No. 11, p. 19.

57. *Final Act*, cited, p. 179-188.

58. The discussion, remarkable for the absence of recrimination, was characterized by substantial unanimity. The only division of opinion expressed related to Article 11 of the convention which forbade recognition of territory acquired by force. Peru (involved in the Leticia dispute) and Brazil, while approving the doctrine of non-recognition in principle, did not consider it subject to codification. *Diario*, No. 16, p. 41-53.

59. During the debate, Sr. Portell Vilá of Cuba attacked the legitimacy of the Permanent Treaty embodying the Platt Amendment, declaring that it was legally void, due to the diplomatic coercion employed by United States representatives and the military intervention existing at the time. Cf. *Diario*, No. 16, p. 27-29.

was supported by Dr. Puig Casauranc of Mexico in an address in which he paid enthusiastic tribute to President Roosevelt and the New Deal, and proclaimed that Mexico had forgotten its rancors. The New Deal, he declared, should express itself in inter-American affairs, not by words alone, but by revision of the Monroe Doctrine and the Platt Amendment, a more flexible recognition policy, and the abandonment of intervention.

Dr. Saavedra Lamas had been expected by some to turn the debate into the channel desired by the United States. Instead, he reaffirmed Argentina's traditional opposition to all intervention and called for the revision of those treaties and conventions which sanction it. He argued that the progress of international law was making possible the peaceful solution of those questions—foreign loans, the defense of corporations, and the protection of lives and property abroad—which formerly were supposed to justify intervention. Argentina, declared the Foreign Minister, plans to present to the next Pan-American Conference conventions designed to create legal norms on these three points.

As the debate proceeded, and one delegate after another rose to bring the condemnation of intervention nearer to unanimity, all eyes turned toward Mr. Hull. It was seen that he was making various changes in his manuscript, deleting certain lines, pencilling notes in the margin. Finally he arose, and speaking hesitantly and to a degree impromptu, he declared that "under the Roosevelt administration the United States government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the government of other nations." Referring to President Roosevelt's recent expression of willingness to revise the Platt Amendment, he continued: "I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration." He regretted that time had not been available "to prepare interpretations and definitions" of the fundamental terms employed in the convention. Meanwhile, should differences of interpretation arise, he announced that the United States government would follow the doctrines and policies embodied in the addresses of President Roosevelt, in his own peace statement to the Conference on December 15, "and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted."^{59a}

^{59a}. The complete text of the Hull declarations is as follows:

"The policy and attitude of the United States government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite

This statement stopped short of a categorical renunciation of intervention on the part of the United States. But it went farther than the Latin Americans had been led to expect, or apparently the United States delegation had originally intended. The Hull declaration was warmly acclaimed by succeeding speakers. Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos, however, a delegate of Nicaragua at the Havana Conference when United States marines were occupying his country, rose to break the silence he had maintained since that gathering and to say that he had made the journey of thousands of miles from Nicaragua "purely and exclusively" to vote on this question. He touched the crux of the problem still remaining when he suggested that the Hull declarations, if they were to have permanent value, should be put into juridical form. The convention was finally approved by a unanimous vote, the only reservations on the intervention question being those presented by the United States.

On December 28, two days after the Montevideo Conference adjourned, President Roosevelt speaking in Washington before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation made the anti-intervention pledge of his administration more explicit by the statement that "the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention." These declarations by the President and his Secretary of State have gone far to justify the former's assertion that "a better state of feeling among the neighbor nations of North and Central and South America exists today than at any time within a generation."⁶⁰

than they have been made by both word and action especially since March 4. I have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt administration the United States government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every Government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted."

Cf. Final Act, cited, p. 187-188.

⁶⁰. State Department. *Press Releases*, December 30, 1933.

APPRAISAL OF THE CONFERENCE

While some commentators have hailed the Montevideo gathering as a signal triumph, others have declared that the conferees in reality did nothing, but did it so well they called their work a success.⁶¹ Still others, rejecting both these extreme positions, allege that the true significance of the Conference can only be appraised in the light of the limited attainments of previous Pan-American assemblies, and of the restricted action open to a conclave representing twenty different governments.

The tangible achievements of the Conference alone hardly suffice to justify optimistic conclusions. In the economic field, where the very desperateness of existing conditions had begotten hopes of miraculous relief, adoption of the Hull tariff declaration constituted the most definite accomplishment; and only the assurance that this declaration was "non-obligatory" in character made such action possible. Although approval was interpreted as a moral victory for the cause of international cooperation—then on the defensive before the forces of economic nationalism—prompt steps to carry out its provisions on the part of the United States as well as the Latin-American countries will be required, if it is to be saved from relegation to the limbo of well-meaning platitudes. On currency stabilization, debt defaults and other pressing questions, the Conference did not even attempt to secure an agreement in principle, but shelved these topics for possible consideration at future assemblies.

In the political field, the re-establishment of peace constituted the most urgent question at Montevideo. The Conference made an active attempt to end the Chaco conflict. By wisely coordinating its efforts with those of the League of Nations and President Terra, it secured a temporary truce. Unfortunately this victory proved but fleeting. The Conference adjourned with the problem of lasting peace unsolved and, once its active influence was removed, the League commission was unable to prevent resumption of hostilities. The unwillingness of the American states to pledge support to possible League sanctions has been criticized as one factor in the failure of peace efforts.

More effective cooperation against future wars was promised by the united approval of five peace treaties. The significance of this achievement, however, was viewed with considerable skepticism, when linked with the failure to end the existing conflict. The very multiplicity of these anti-war pacts, moreover, may give rise to conflicting interpretations and thus confuse future peace efforts.

The approval of the anti-intervention convention represented the most concrete and clear-cut action taken by the Conference, and the agreement achieved promises an unexpectedly satisfactory solution for this thorny question. Despite the character of the Hull reservations—by which the promise of United States support was limited to the present administration and made to rest principally on statements of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State—the Latin Americans hailed this move as a long step forward toward the outlawry of intervention. The declarations concerning equal rights for women will require sustained and vigorous action on the part of women's organizations in the several countries to make them anything more than theoretical gains.

In the field of the intangibles, the Conference may more easily perhaps justify claims for success. The essential objective of the gathering, according to some, was to forward inter-American understanding so as "to have spirits more closely joined and hands more vigorously clasped."⁶² It is generally agreed that the Montevideo gathering went further toward creating genuine good will than any preceding Pan-American conference. For the United States, the gains in this field were particularly evident. The hostility of past gatherings was largely absent; unfriendly criticism was at a minimum. Argentina, formerly a suspicious rival, was converted into a helpful associate. Some observers point out, nevertheless, that at best Montevideo achieved an understanding, not between peoples, but between governments, many of which are unrepresentative and reactionary dictatorships. They question, furthermore, the permanence of the rapprochement between Argentina and the United States, and ask if it may have unfavorable repercussions on Washington's relations with Brazil, Mexico and other Latin American countries, thus tending to disrupt Pan-Americanism.

While due weight should be given these qualifications, the positive gains at Montevideo represent a definite advance toward a spirit of solidarity and more friendly understanding. Secretary Hull has testified to the new attitude of the Latin Americans with respect to the United States.⁶³ This attitude was in large part a response to recent shifts in Washington's own policy toward Latin America. Should subsequent events strengthen such a trend, this enhancement of mutual trust may eventually stand out as the most significant achievement of the Seventh International Conference of American States.

62. *Diario*, No. 7, p. 9.

61. Gaston Nerval, "The 'Success' at Montevideo," *Bolivia* (New York), January-February 1934, p. 17.

63. State Department, *Press Releases*, January 27, 1934, p. 44.